Europeias: siglas e ‘slogans’


Pedro Correia,

Aliança Portugal (AP)

«Na Europa por Portugal»

 

Bloco de Esquerda (BE)

«De Pé!»

 

Coligação Democrática Unitária (CDU)

«Defender o povo e o País»

 

Livre (L)

«Pela liberdade, pela esquerda, pela Europa e pela ecologia»

 

Movimento Alternativa Socialista (MAS)

«Por um novo 25 de Abril»

 

Nova Democracia (PND)

«Nestas eleições não vote nos mesmos»

 

Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (PCTP-MRPP)

«Sair do euro»

 

Partido da Terra (MPT)

«Mais verdade na política»

 

Partido Democrático do Atlântico (PDA)

«A nossa Europa»

 

Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR)

«Portugal aos portugueses»

 

Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista (POUS)

«Sem explorados nem exploradores»

 

Partido Pelos Animais e Pela Natureza (PAN)

«Reestruturar a Europa»

 

Partido Popular Monárquico (PPM)

«Acorda Portugal!»

 

Partido Pró Vida (PPV)

«Vote valores»

 

Partido Socialista (PS)

«Mudança»

 

Partido Trabalhista Português (PTP)

«É preciso votar no José Manuel Coelho»

 

ADENDA: alterei os slogans do MPT e do PDA. Com o meu agradecimento ao leitor daMaia.

Reflexões (post-scriptum)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

“The study of politics is necessarily part of politics, is committed to the preservation of free politics, but not to any particular form of politics, still less to party doctrine.“

 

“The moral consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior to or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics itself.“

 

“To renounce or destroy politics is to destroy the very thing which gives order to the pluralism and variety of civilized society, the things which enables us to enjoy variety without suffering either anarchy or the tyranny of single truths, which become the desperate salvation from anarchy – just as misogamy and celibacy are forms of salvation for the overly passionate mind.“

 

“A government whose legitimacy is not maintained by a public adhesion to method, means, procedure, and participation will need the propagation of a myth of a single, true, substantive consensus as a kind of teleological `final-cause´ for society. And perhaps there are still societies in which the existence of such a consensus, drawn from religions foundations, hinders the development of a political system of government.“

 

“Realism from above is as necessary as clamour from below in acceptance of great political reforms – the history of the British franchise shows this. Clearly political rule is the best form of government, in many circumstances.” – Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, Continuum, 5th edition, 2009 reprinted.  

 

 

 

Reflexões (20)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

“Political parties are far older than democracy. They have existed in nearly all countries and under all forms of government, though less in monarchies than in oligarchies, in the latter of which they have been particularly frequent and fierce. The Guelfs and Ghibellines, after having for a time divided Germany, divided the feudal nobility and the cities of northern and middle Italy for three centuries. (…)

To begin with, parties are inevitable. No free large country has been without them. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them. They bring order out of the chaos of a multitude of voters. If in such vast populations as those of the United States, France, or England, there were no party organizations, by whom would public opinion be roused and educated and directed to certain specific purposes? Each party, no doubt, tries to present its own side of the case for or against any doctrine or proposal, but the public cannot help learning something about the other side also, for even party spirit cannot separate the nation into water-tight compartments; and the most artful or prejudiced party spell-binder or newspaper has to recognize the existence of the arguments he is trying to refute. Thus Party strife is a sort of education for those willing to receive instruction, and something soaks through even into the less interested or thoughtful electors. The parties keep a nation’s mind alive, as the rise and fall of the sweeping tide freshens the water of long ocean inlets.

Discussion within each party, culminating before elections in the adoption of a platform, brings certain issues to the front, defines them, expresses them in formulas which, even if tricky or delusive, fix men’s minds on certain points, concentrating attention and inviting criticism.” – Viscount James Bryce, Modern Democracies, New York: Macmillan Company, vol. 1, 1921, pp.81-84

Reflexões (19)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

“The challenge that the parties face is not merely to espouse programs with popular appeal, but also to demonstrate that they play a crucial political role – from the recruitment of leaders to the implementation of policies.“;

 

“In order to regain the level of prominence they formely held in the public mind, the parties need people to make the connection between them and what is done by government to address the most important problems“. – Martin P. Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996, Harvard University Press, pp. 127-149

Reflexões (18)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

“The parties, in fact, have played a major role as makers of governments, more especially they have been the makers of democratic government” – E. E. Schattschnneider, Party Government, Chapter 1 In Defense of Political Parties, Rinehart & Company, Inc., New York,  1942 (1977 reprinted, Greenwood Press)

Reflexões (17)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

“The more a party seeks influence in society, the more it will require a mass membership.” – Jan Sundberg, Finland: Nationalized Parties, Professionalized Organizations, in Richard Katz & Peter Mair, How Parties Organize, Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, Sage, 1995

Reflexões (16)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

“Party leaders have little incentive to recruit and retain new members if the taxpayers pickup the costs of running the party organisation. (…) Thus the state itself may be smothering voluntary party activity.

If party organisations become denuded of volunteers, then political parties are even more likely to become wholly dependent on the state. This could have wider consequences for party systems throughout the world. If this promotes anti-party sentiments and serves to weaken party identification in electorates then the consequences of contemporary democracy will be serious. Such a development is likely to lead to lower turnouts, more support for anti-system parties and problems of governance in general. Weak parties can produce policy gridlock and institutional sclerosis (…).[A] weakening of parties is likely to make government in general more difficult.” – Peter Whiteley, Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world, Paper, Political Studies Association Meeting, University of Manchester, 2009 

Reflexões (15)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

“Though each country may have retained the institutional features of its post-war political economy — statism in France, tripartite corporatist regulation in Germany — both experienced similar patterns of market liberalization followed by budgetary retrenchment. In turn, these processes ended up affecting the same social sectors in both countries, notably low-skill industrial and tertiary sector workers, in similar ways, resulting in the mobilization of these losing sectors by populist parties of the radical Right and radical Left. And if the political polarity of these parties was different in each country, this, as we have indicated, had more to do with the cultural and ideational orientations of the groups to whom these parties appealed, as well as the internal and external capacities of the latter to broaden their appeal, than with the institutional configurations of the French and German economies and political systems.

In short, for certain countries or groups of countries at least, neoliberal modernization is having similar structural-institutional and socio-cultural effects which in turn are fuelling various forms of radical populist politics.” – Gabriel Goodliffe, The price of disengagement: radical populism in France and Germany, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2012, 20:2, p.153

Reflexões (14)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

 

“[B]oth the SPD and the CDU mostly seek to consolidate their membership organisations. Both emphasise traditional membership recruitment and maintenance, combined with expansion of intra-democratic rights. However, both are also open to innovation by opening up their parties to non-partisans in order to adapt to societal change. The introduction of temporary membership could be seen as a move to consolidate the membership organisation. (…) The parties are warming up to more innovation, as there is no sign to the decline trend turning.” – Hilmar Langhelle Mjelde, How and Why Parties Respond to Membership Decline: The Case of the SPD and the CDU, German Politics, 2013, 22:3, 253-269

Reflexões (13)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

 

“The trend in membership is clear: the traditional Danish mass parties have all experienced a dramatic reduction in the number of individual members.

Starting in the 1950s, the reduction accelerated in the 1970s, slowed down in the 1980s and stabilized in the 1990s, albeit still with a minor downward trend. The decline has not been compensated for by any significant increase in the membership of the new parties which, despite having adopted an organizational structure similar to that of the traditional mass party, and despite explicitly hoping to organize as large a proportion of the electorate as possible, have not succeeded in persuading voters to join in any significant numbers. In sum, the individual membership (which is also the only kind of membership) of the Danish political parties has decreased from a total of about 515,000 in 1960 to about 180,000 in 2000 or from around 22 percent of the electorate in 1960 to less than 5 percent in 2000.

With membership declining so dramatically it could be asked whether or not the parties are still able to fulfill the functions traditionally assigned to them in representative democracies.” – Karina Pedersen et al., Sleeping or active partners: Danish party members at the turn of the Millennium, Party Politics, Vol. 10, no. 4, 2004, p. 368

Reflexões (12)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

 

“(…) [C]onfrontados com as crescentes ausências de comprometimento político e indiferença populares, confrontados com o declínio da sua capacidade representativa, confrontados com o declínio da sua presença organizacional e, finalmente, confrontados também com a persuasiva linguagem de uma nova geração de teóricos democráticos que procuram soluções na sociedade civil, mais do que no mundo da política, poderão os partidos ter um futuro?” – Peter Mair, Os partidos políticos e a democracia, Análise Social, 167, 2003, pp. 289-290   

Reflexões (11)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

“The Reform Act of 1867 was one of the decisive events, perhaps the decisive event, in modern English history. It was this act that transformed England into a democracy and made democracy not only a respectable form of government (the United States was never quite respectable), but also, it was soon taken for granted, the only natural and proper form of government. To be sure, the act had to be supplemented by others, household suffrage in the boroughs, as provided by the Act of 1867, being several steps re-moved from universal suffrage. But once this first step was made, no one seriously doubted that the others would follow. The Act of 1867, perhaps more than that of 1832, deserves the title of the Great Reform Bill. For while 1832 had no necessary aftermath in 1867, 1867 did have a necessary aftermath in 1884, 1918, 1928 – the later acts that genuinely universalized the suffrage, not only for Britain but for all those countries that took Britain to be the model of a parliamentary government.” – Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Politics of Democracy: The English Reform Act of 1867, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Nov., 1966), p. 97

Reflexões (10)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

 

“Although there is no doubt that parties still ‘are the central mechanism to make the constitutional chain of political delegation and accountability work in practice’ (Muller, 2000: 330), they find it more and more difficult to recover their legitimacy. They know they need to regain the ‘hearts and minds’ of the citizens. The question is how? Devoid of an ideological flame, for which there is no room in the liquid society, as we have seen, parties have shown an increase in openness and, to a lesser extent, responsiveness and accountability. How well this remedy will work is not clear: it may be too early for a fair assessment, but it should be noted that while parties have introduced participatory incentives, they have continued to colonize the state and drain its resources for their own activities. Parties persist in the use of selective incentives ‘to generate internal support’ (Bolleyer, 2008: 2), but by following this route they continue to lose credibility and thus legitimacy.Panem et circenses, the tools the Roman emperors used to reward and flatter the mob, never work for long.

(…) [I]n the first years of the new millennium, parties appear to be powerful and rich but devoid of internal energy and at odds with the external environment. They resemble something like a post-modern, somewhat inconsistent Leviathan: mighty but not frightening, forceful but disliked, pervasive but discredited.” – Piero Ignazi, Power and the (il)legitimacy of political parties: An unavoidable paradox of contemporary democracy?,Party Politics, 2014, Vol. 2(2), p. 166

Reflexões (9)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

“There is a considerable amount of literature analysing party members in relation to the intensity with which they hold their opinions (May, 1973) and also to the orientations to action that their beliefs lead them to (Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995), but the common assumption is that members are in a party that corresponds to their personal ideological orientations. Given that parties are far from homogeneous entities, it is inevitable that they will contain members who differ on more than immediate policy prescriptions.

Some are bound to find themselves at odds with the party’s basic positions, and in that situation individuals have the option of leaving to join another party (or simply leaving active party membership), or of staying either as passive loyalists or vocal activists trying to change their party (Hirschman, 1970).

Those who stay despite recognizing they do not share the perspectives and political orientation of their party might be described as misfits. Misfits can therefore be defined as individual members who recognize a marked distance between their own orientation and that of their party. This category of member is of particular interest in the study of parties, and for several reasons. First, it can provide some insight into the profile of those most susceptible to exit. Surveys of party members cannot provide information on exmembers, but studying the misfits may be a first step in that direction. Second, misfits can provide information on internal ideological variation and incongruence, opening a window on factionalism and intra-party conflict, which are understudied aspects of political parties. Third, misfits may be crucial in our understanding the decision-making dynamics within political parties, which is another understudied topic in party politics.

Finally, the concept of party misfits gives us a new tool for testing May’s law of curvilinear disparity (1973) if we associate the party’s position with its upper-level elites. Identifying the misfits can help us identify and understand who the party radicals are.” – Emily van Haute and R. Kenneth Carty, Ideological misfits: a distinctive class of party members, Party Politics, 2012, 18 (6), p. 886

Reflexões (8)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

 

“The principal reward of politics to the amateur is the sense of having satisfied a felt obligation to `participate´, and this satisfaction is greater the higher the value the amateur can attach to the ends which the outcomes of politics serves. The principal reward of the professional is to be found in the extrinsic satisfactions of participation-power, income, status, or the fun of the game. The ideal amateur has a `natural´ response to politics; he sees each battle as a `crisis´, and each victory as a triumph and each loss as a defeat for a cause. The professional tends, by contrast, to develop a certain immunity to its excitement and its outcomes.” – James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat Club Politics in Three Cities, University of California Press, 1962, p. 4   

Reflexões (7)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

“Le terme `cadre´ recouvrait à l´origine une notion militaire, désignant la charpente d´une unité de base ou d´une unité combattante. Cette idée d´un petit noyau permanent composé d´un personnel bien entrainé et appelé à fournir les bases d´un accroissement rapide en cas de guerre ou de tout autre besoin répondait parfaitement, dans la conception de Lénine, aux caractéristiques essentielles de toute armée composée de révolutionnaires professionnels. Lénine reprit donc le terme ´cadre´ pour l´appliquer très précisément au responsable d´un parti (…) et pourvu d´un poste au sein de l´appareil.” – Dwaine Marwick, Les cadres des partis politiques en Allemagne, Revue Française de Sociologie, 1966, 7-1, Le comportement politique – Études Comparés réunis et présentées par Mattei Dogan

Reflexões (6)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

“The party-day party penetrates and controls the state, following to some degree in the footsteps of the totalitarian party. Taking into full consideration the different, and contrasting, systemic context, both types of parties occupy the state and they both live on state resources. However, compared to the totalitarian party, the present-day party clearly lacks of the same control over, and penetration into, society. The present-day party does not share the ´total` integrative function described by Sigmund Neumann (1956), because it aims to control only the state and not the society as well” – Piero Ignazi, Power and the (il)legitimacy of political parties: An unavoidable paradox of contemporary democracy?, Party Politics, 2014, Vol. 2 (2), p. 161

Reflexões (5)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

“What kinds of representative democracy are thinkable. And what forms of party (…), if any, are appropriate to them?” – M. Saward, Making representations: Modes and strategies of political parties, European Review, 16, 2008, p. 284

 

 

Reflexões (4)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

 

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the average ratio of party membership to the electorate across (old and new) European democracies hovers around 5 percent (…). In 1980, by contrast, an average of almost 10 percent of the electorates of the older democracies was affiliated to a political party, and at the beginning of the 1960s the average party membership ratio stood at almost 15 percent (…). In other words, parties in contemporary European democracies are clearly losing their organizational hold on society and their capacity to engage citizens in the way they once did.” – Ingrid van Biezen and Thomas Poguntke, The decline of membership-based politics, Party Politics, 2014, Vol. 20(2), p. 206

Reflexões (3)


Sérgio de Almeida Correia,

 

 

“Avec des partis affaiblis, les intérêts spécifiques tendraient immanquablement à dominer de façon de plus en plus sensible l’ensemble des décisions politiques gouvernementales. Lorsque le système des partis est faible, les intérêts particuliers occupent une place dominante. Ainsi en l’absence d’organisations destinées par essence à agréger les intérêts à un niveau plus large, des ambitions plus spécifiques et naturellement plus restreintes tendent à prendre le dessus. Les plus efficaces représentent habituellement les intérêts des plus favorisés et des plus puissants au sein de la société. L’absence de partis forts déforme le processus de décision politique en faveur d’intérêts qui possèdent au départ le pouvoir et les ressources suffisantes pour se faire entendre.

Une troisième conséquence de l’affaiblissement des partis tient au renforcement de la position des «entrepreneurs politiques», détenteurs des ressources nécessaires à l’achat de leur représentation au sein du gouvernement. Les entreprises politico-financières de Silvio Berlusconi en Italie ou de Ross Perot aux États-Unis nous fournissent des exemples récents et saisissants d’un tel processus. Chacun d’eux est parvenu à móbiliser un soutien électoral à partir d’un message politique à dominante populiste.”- Patrick Seyd et Paul F. Whiteley, L’évolution recente dês adhérents du Parti conservateur et du parti travailliste en Grande-Bretagne, RFSP, 46, vol. 6, 1996: 934